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MARK  TUSHNET*
In this comment I  want to address two points suggested  by Professor
Finnis's essay "Natural Law and Legal Reasoning." I say "suggested by"
deliberately,  for I  do not want to attribute  the points  in their full force
to him, although I believe that his essay lends itself to a reading in which
those  points  would be  given  their full  force.  The  points deal  with the
question  of "easy questions" and what Professor  Finnis calls the "suffi-
cient and  necessarily  artificial  clarity and definiteness"  that yields an-
swers  to such questions, and with the way in  which legal professionals
are likely  to  understand  the  "theory  of practical  reasoning"  to  which
Professor Finnis is committed. In discussing these points I will move back
and forth between what I have elsewhere  called the sociological  and the
philosophical  strands in critical  legal studies.'  At the  conclusion of the
comment I will note briefly some of my disquiets about the enterprise of
the comment itself.
I. EASY  QUESTIONS
A typical  response to  the CLS claim of indeterminacy  is to point  out
that lawyers certainly, and lay people in some cases, have the experience
of confronting  and  resolving  easy cases.2 In discussing  easy questions,
Professor Finnis uses  the term  "algorithm," which  I believe  is sympto-
matic of the images that the "easy questions" response trades upon. That
is, we  know that there  are easy questions  because  we  know that there
are legal rules that use mathematical  terms which are,  at least for  all
practical  purposes, 3  completely  determinate-the  periods  identified  in
statutes of limitations,  for example, or the various mathematical  provi-
sions in the United States Constitution. Further, though this point is less
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., Harvard College;
M.A.,  Yale  University; J.D.,  Yale  Law School.  I want to thank Anita Allen and
the participants  in the Cleveland State conference  for their comments on a draft
of this essay.
I Tushnet, Some Current Controversies in Critical  Legal Studies, in CRITICAL
LEGAL THOUGHT:  A GERMAN-AMERICAN  DEBATE  (C.Joerges & D.Trubek eds. 1989).
I  should note that I  no  longer think it correct, and am inclined to think  it un-
helpful, to distinguish between these two strands except for purposes of a certain
kind of exposition (fortunately, the kind exemplified by this comment). My concern
is that the distinction may,  to use a favorite  CLS term,  reify the disciplines  of
sociology  and philosophy rather than, as most people associated with CLS would
prefer, dissolve the disciplinary distinction altogether.
IIn addition  to Finnis's comments, which are of course not directed, at least
explicitly,  at the CLS  claims  about indeterminacy,  see Schauer, Easy Cases, 58
S.  CAL. L. REV.  399 (1985), which has become  probably the standard citation  for
the point.
II mean by this to put aside  Wittgensteinian-or  Kripkean -worries  about
the understandability of mathematical  terms.
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often made, it  is trivially easy to posit a legal rule that is also completely
determinate: "Plaintiffs always win" or "Litigants named Tushnet always
lose."4
If  the existence of this sort of easy question refuted the CLS claim  of
indeterminacy, one might wonder how people with law degrees from re-
spectable universities could  ever have offered  the indeterminacy  claim.
And, because  it  is generally conceded that at least some CLS adherents,
if perhaps deeply wrong-headed, are at least not incredibly stupid, there
has to be something wrong with the use of this sort of example to refute
the CLS indeterminacy  claim. I will suggest several candidates for what
is wrong.
First, the examples provide  what we  might call  "existence  proofs"  of
the  possibility  of determinacy,  or simple  counterexamples.  If,  however,
the  CLS indeterminacy  claim was not that there was  never  and never
could be a determinate legal rule, an existence proof or a counterexample
does not refute the claim.  When I have stated the indeterminacy claim,
I  have  used  terms  like  "interesting"  to qualify  the  claim,  as  in,  "No
interesting  legal  propositions  are determinate."  I  have recognized,  of
course, that that and cognate formulations must place a lot of weight on
the  term "interesting"  or substitutes  therefore,  and  I will discuss  the
kinds of weight later in this section. For now, however, the point is simply
that identifying some linguistically determinate rule' need not refute the
indeterminacy  claim properly understood.
This point may be  put somewhat differently. Imagine that we had a
metric by which the determinacy  of words or legal rules could be  meas-
ured;  call each  unit a "determinile," and assume that a completely  in-
determinate  rule measures zero  on the scale, while a  fully determinate
one  measures  100  determiniles.  I suggest that most legal  academics  in
the United States would say that the general measure of determinacy  is
around  40 to  60  determiniles;  that  is, overall, legal rules are not  com-
pletely  determinate  but they  are  not completely  indeterminate  either.
The CLS claim, I suggest, is that the measure of indeterminacy  is about
15  to 5 determiniles. There is a gap between the CLS understanding  of
the degree of indeterminacy  and the mainstream understanding, but no
one on either side claims that the positions are at the polar extremes. On
this view, an existence proof or counterexample might show only that we
have  identified  a  rule that falls into  the 5-15  determiniles  range that,
even  CLS people agree, includes determinate rules.
Second, it seems to me significant that the core examples of determinate
legal rules invoke mathematical  terms. This can show, at most, that the
domains of law and of mathematics-or other equivalently determinate
ways  of speaking-sometimes  come  into  contact,  or, to adopt  another
mathematical metaphor, that the two domains overlap to some degree as
For additional  discussion,  see infra text accompanying notes 13-15.
sSee, e.g.,  M. TUSHNET,  RED, WHITE,  AND BLUE:  A CRITICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  CON-
STITUTIONAL  LAW 52  (1988).
'Again subject to Kripkean  worries.
[Vol. 38:137
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in some Venn diagrams. It does not show that the entire domain of law
is just like the domain  of mathematics.  Again,  if the CLS claim  of in-
determinacy is limited to some sub-set of possible legal propositions,  such
as "interesting ones," the existence of points of contact between law and
determinate domains, or the existence of some degree of overlap, does not
refute the CLS claim, at least if the points of contact are not so numerous
or the amount of overlap  is not so great as to make the CLS claim un-
interesting. But, precisely because the examples of determinacy  tend to
be mathematical or otherwise tangential to what really happens in law,
I doubt that the points of contact are numerous enough to weigh heavily
against the CLS claim.
7
Third, we should consider what actually happens in law when statutes
of limitations  are involved.
8  There  are disputes  over whether  to  count
Sundays  for purposes of statutes of limitations, which actually  are dis-
putes  over what a  number used  in a legal rule really  means.  I  do  not
want to make too much of these disputes, though, because there are more
important examples for my purposes. There are two typical disputes over
statutes of limitations:  (1) From what date does the statute run,9 and (2)
Which of several possible statutes of limitations should apply in the cir-
cumstances.
1 0 That is, the  existence of a fully determinate provision ar-
guably applicable to the situation at hand does not mean that the actual
resolution of the problem is determinate.
I would like to identify the reason  for that as a fourth response to the
"easy questions" claim, though it probably is not an independent reason.
In the dispute between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller over the problems of
the core and penumbra of legal propositions, Fuller pointed out that legal
propositions  typically do not turn on the interpretation  of single words,
but on "a sentence,  a paragraph,  or a whole page or more  of text."'1  For
present  purposes,  I  want  to take  this  as  pointing  out,  correctly, that
individual  legal propositions-that  the statute of limitations  is  four
years-are embedded in a complex domain including many other relevant
legal propositions, and that the resolution of any particular legal problem
turns not on the meaning of any individual proposition but on the mean-
, For an interesting though I believe almost completely wrong-headed extended
discussion claiming-in the terms used here-that the points of contact are indeed
quite substantial, see Winter, Transcendental  Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning,
and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137  U. PA. L. REv.  1105 (1989).
8  In working through the example of the constitutional  requirement that the
President be over 35 and a native-born citizen, I have suggested that were there
sufficient  political  pressure  to  elect  a  32-year-old  President  or  to elect  Henry
Kissinger President, lawyers would start to make arguments, which would start
to sound  credible,  about these rules.  My  view  is that it is only  because  no  one
has a present interest in making those arguments  that they sound implausible
when they are devised to meet the purported counterexamples  the constitutional
provisions are taken to provide. For additional discussion of this point, see  infra
note  15 accompanying  text.
9See, e.g., Lorance v. American Tel. & Tel.,  109 S.Ct. 2261  (1989).
10 See, e.g.,  Owens v. Okure,  109 S.Ct. 573 (1989).
11  Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A  Response to Professor Hart, 71
HARv. L. REV.  630, 663 (1958).
1990]
3
Tushnet: A Critical Legal Studies Perspective
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990140  CLEVELAND  STATE  LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 38:137
ing of all the propositions, all at once. 1 2 If that is so, an "existence proof'
that includes  a single legal proposition establishes nothing at all.'3
Consider again the determinate rule that plaintiffs always win. I know
of no  legal system  that incorporates  such  a rule, and there  is a reason
for that,  I  suspect.  Such  a  rule  would be  felt  to be intolerable  in  any
system that held itself out to be a legal system.  Similarly with the rule
about plaintiffs named Tushnet. In the legal system of the United States,
such a rule  would almost certainly be unconstitutional  as a violation  of
notions of equal  protection, 14 and  I suspect that similar  notions can  be
found in any  system that holds itself out as a legal system.
There are some points at which the preceding discussion is vulnerable,
though  I  believe  that the weaknesses  are  not serious.  I  have assumed
that the legal  domain  includes many  other relevant legal  propositions.
It could be that, with respect to some interesting purportedly determinate
rule,  the  domain  includes  only  a few relevant  legal propositions.  If so,
the domain itself may be sufficiently determinate to defeat the CLS claim;
the determinile measure may get up to 40 or 50. What is crucial here, of
course, is the specification of criteria of relevancy  to restrict the domain
of relevant propositions. Yet, it seems to me the mark of a talented lawyer
to devise  arguments  that demonstrate  the  arguable relevance  of rules
that a less talented lawyer would think irrelevant at the outset. Coming
up with creative analogies is, after all, an important part of what lawyers
do.  If one incorporates  this notion of lawyering into the definition of the
legal system, it is unlikely that the legal system taken as a whole would
be sufficiently determinate  to defeat the CLS claim of indeterminacy.
I  believe  it  will  be  helpful  now  to  return  to  the  other  examples  of
determinate  rules, like  "Plaintiffs  always lose," which will  allow us to
consider what makes  a legal proposition  "interesting."' ' 5 Let us suppose,
though, that for some reason or other, the relevant  law-makers happen
to declare such a rule as law. What would happen? At first, of course, the
rule being obviously determinate would be applied across the board, pro-
ducing  results that people  would  generally agree  were  unjust. At that
point, the  rule  might  be repealed,  which would  give  us no  interesting
analytical insights. Alternatively, though, the rule might be "interpreted"
to avoid manifest injustice. I would think that the techniques for such a
reinterpretation  would be apparent to well-trained lawyers. It would be-
12  1 put it in this strong form, which I believe correct, but my basic point would
hold were the statement in the text to be modified to say "all relevant-or nearby -
propositions."
13  For  an example,  using one of the mathematical  propositions  of the Consti-
tution, see M. TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 61-62.
141  put it in this way to elide the differences, if any, between the  equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the ideas of equal protection that
the  Supreme  Court has held are  present  in the  due process  clause of the  fifth
amendment.
1 6 For a discussion of why such rules do not appear in real legal  systems, see
supra note  14 and accompanying  text.
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gin  to  happen  that  people  who  filed  certain  kinds of claims  would  be
described,  not as "plaintiffs" subject to the determinate rule, but as, for
example, "claimants" or "victims." And because the rule does not say that
claimants always lose, injustice could be  avoided.
(I do not think that this example  is entirely fanciful, though because
the postulated  determinate  rule  is fanciful,  I  suppose I  am entitled  to
some fancy in my response. The implausibility of the response is generated
by the implausibility of the initial hypothetical, not by a weakness in the
underlying argument about indeterminacy. Further, I suggest that some-
thing like it characterizes the development of legal rules in systems where
there are competing legal jurisdictions. If a person is excluded from one,
or is likely to lose  in one, because  of a determinate rule applied in that
jurisdiction, he or she will go  to the other and argue that the preferred
system has jurisdiction.)
This discussion suggests that we might think of "interesting legal ques-
tions," that is, those to which the CLS  indeterminacy  claim applies,  as
those that are likely to generate real disputes. In an important way, this
definition  of the  scope  of the CLS indeterminacy  claim  converges  with
Finnis's concern with practical reason, but in doing so it shows why the
existence of easy questions is basically irrelevant to the more important
matters bound up with the idea of practical reason. As Finnis says, "prac-
tical  reasoning  moves  from  reasons  for  action  to  choices  (and  actions)
guided by those reasons."'16 This suggests, as Alisdair Macintyre has said
specifically, that practical  reason comes  into play only where there is a
choice to be made,'
17 that is, where one wonders about the possible reasons
for competing choices or courses of action. Easy questions are, precisely,
those  as to  which there  appear  to  be no  competing  choices.  Yet,  if, as
Finnis also says, "legal reasoning is, broadly speaking, practical reason-
ing," it would appear that the existence of easy questions has nothing to
do with legal reasoning."8
This conclusion,  though,  may be too abrupt. For one thing, it is rea-
sonably  clear that what one  group  of people regard  at one point  as  an
easy question, another group, or the same group at some other time, might
see as not so easy after all.' 9 If what are easy questions change over time
or across groups, it is reasonably clear that "easiness" is not a property
of words alone, but is a property of words in particular communities under
particular  circumstances.  It is reasonably  clear  as well that questions
once easy become more difficult when some  social group with sufficient
political power finds that its interests would be promoted were the ques-
tion to become controverted, that is, to become an occasion for demanding
reasons for choices and courses of action-in the usual instance, I believe,
ilFinnis, Natural  Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEV. ST.  L. REv.  1 (1990).
17  A. MACINTYRE,  WHOSE  JUSTICE,  WHAT  RATIONALITY  54  (1988).
18  It  should  be  noted,  too,  that  in  this  version  there  is  nothing about  legal
reasoning that sets it apart from other forms of practical  reasoning.
19  1 have elsewhere used the example of the question, once  hotly contested, of
whether West Virginia was legally created and therefore entitled to two Senators.
M. TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 69 n.153.
1990]
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an  occasion  for demanding  reasons for the maintenance  of the existing
social order. To put the point in a somewhat different way, selecting among
competing  alternatives,  which  is  what  practical  reasoning  consists  in,
involves selecting  a course of action  that will bring us  acceptably  close
to our goal. Yet, the criteria for determining what will count as acceptably
close are socially constructed.
This is not to say, of course, that once the questions become the occasions
for contention that new answers  will be  given,  or rather, that new ar-
rangements will be devised. In one sense, there cannot be "new" answers
at all, for the  easiness of easy questions is precisely that no one thinks
that they  have to  be  answered,  or indeed  that they  are questions. My
hypothesis,  though,  is that the fact that people ask for  answers where
once they needed none is a signal of a shift in underlying political forces.
If that hypothesis  is correct, however, it has implications  for our un-
derstanding of practical  reasoning  as well. I have been arguing, in es-
sence,  that the CLS  claim  of indeterminacy  stands up  to the "easy
questions" challenge  because  that challenge  does  not address the prob-
lems of practical reasoning that characterize,  or define, legal reasoning.
Yet, if the category of "easy questions"  is itself defined with reference to
underlying political forces, there would seem to be some overlap between
politics  and the concept of practical  reasoning as well.2 0  Even if there is
no such conceptual  overlap, however, I am reasonably sure that there is
a practical  overlap, to which  I now turn.
II.  PRACTICAL  REASONING  IN LAWYERS'  DISCOURSE
The terms "practical reason" and phronesis have come into the vocab-
ulary of constitutional lawyers  in the United States in recent years.21 I
do not want to saddle Finnis directly with the misuses of those terms in
that vocabulary, but I do want  to suggest some sociological  dimensions
that deserve  some attention.
At least in the  United States, legal  theory is parasitic upon  develop-
ments in other domains of normative and descriptive social theory. "Prac-
tical  reason"  is  in some  ways just another  essentially  ignorant
appropriation  by lawyers  of concepts  from  other domains,  where  they
have a well-developed background and literature, to be imported to solve
problems  the lawyers have discovered  in their own domain. As used by
academic  lawyers  in the United States, practical reason seems to mean
the good  common sense of the well-socialized  lawyer. To the extent that
the general concept  of practical  reason draws upon the idea that people
engaged in  some  practical  activity  on a  regular basis become adept  at
20  1  take it  to be  uncontroversial  that there  are  overlaps  between  practical
reasoning and the substance of political decisions.
21 For  a  discussion,  convergent  with  mine,  that  cites  sources,  see Feinman,
Practical  Legal Studies and Critical  Legal Studies, 87 MICH.  L. REv.  724 (1988).
[Vol. 38:137
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determining the right way to conduct that activity, the American usage
is at least in the ballpark  of ideas that might circle  around the proper
concept of practical reason.2
Once  we think  about  how  lawyers  are  socialized,  though,  we might
have  some  misgivings  about placing much  normative  weight upon the
conclusions they draw-or, if that suggests too rationalistic a process, the
solutions they arrive at-in the course of their practical activity. I would
begin my analysis by identifying one fact and one myth. The fact is that
the social composition of the lawyering class, including lawyers presently
in practice and those developing the practical skills that will enable them
to become lawyers,  is markedly  skewed. The myth is that the practical
reasoning abilities of lawyers are deployed in helping people resolve their
problems of daily life, whereas those abilities are in fact deployed, at least
in the reaches of the United States legal profession that define what good
legal practice is, on behalf of large organizations attempting to navigate
through the shoals of the modern regulatory state. 3
The social origins of the lawyering class are likely to affect what the
profession regards as sound common sense in an obvious way. On ordinary
assumptions about human motivation, cynically overstated as "who pays
the piper calls the tune," we are likely to find it extraordinarily  difficult
to distinguish between the socialized  sound common  sense of the profes-
sion and the interests of the lawyering class and those for whom it labors.
Sound common sense is likely, therefore, to be shaped by the interests of
those holding power, either because they are like the lawyers  or because
they employ the lawyers.
Perhaps, we might think, the process of socialization into the lawyering
class would moderate the class origins and affiliations of lawyers. I suspect
that that is true, but would  emphasize the word "moderate." The  sound
common sense of the profession might be somewhat more restrained than
the unbridled desires  of the powerful  clientele. In  its organized  expres-
sions, the legal profession in the United States  is today probably some-
what more reasonable  than its clientele,  though the notion of corporate
responsibility has penetrated the corporate elite as well.
24 Yet, it is worth
pointing out that the organized expressions of the bar in the United States
have almost since  the beginning  been  replete  with high-sounding  lan-
guage that is substantially at odds with what the very people  uttering
the  words  were  doing  in their  capacity  as  lawyers  acting on  behalf of
22  For the kind of use of the concept to which I refer, see Burton, Law as Practical
Reason, 62  S.  CAL.  L. REv.  747  (1989).  Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods,  103
HARv.  L. REV.  829, 849-55  (1990),  offers a more  sophisticated treatment, and  a
reference  to the United States literature at 850 n.79, but her treatment is, in my
view, subject to weaker versions of the criticisms I offer in the text.
?3I  limit my  observations  to the  United States  profession  because  I  am not
familiar  enough with the profession  elsewhere  to  be  nearly  as confident  about
my judgments with respect to the bar elsewhere as I am with respect to the United
States bar.
I  I suppose, though, that defenders of the notion of practical reason would see
that  as the penetration  of practical  reason  with respect  to  corporate  activities
into the corporate elite.
1990]
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clients.25  And, there  is a structural  reason to believe  that lawyers  will
not find it to be an important component of common sense to stand against
the  interests  of the  powerful.  One  of the  practical  skills  that  lawyers
develop  is  deferring to-or catering to-those  in power,  in order to get
them to use their power on behalf of the lawyer's clients. The very struc-
ture of the profession, without regard to its class composition, thus places
limits on what the profession is likely to regard as sound common sense. 2 6
The myth of service to individuals enhances limitations  on the profes-
sion's sense of what is sound common sense. The myth is an ideology  in
Mannheim's  classic sense, a story about how people  live their lives that
allows them to engage  in behavior that, in the absence  of such  a story,
they might find normatively troubling. If lawyers are socialized into be-
lieving that they are members  of a "helping profession,"  they are likely
to think  that the judgments  they  arrive  at  are  compassionate  in the
aggregate, even if individual judgments, when viewed by outsiders to the
profession,  might seem  unfeeling.  Of course,  many  individual  lawyers,
perhaps most of them, actually do help real people get on with their lives.
Yet, those  who define  the profession's aspirations-by becoming  leaders
of the bar or by instructing budding lawyers at leading law schools-do
most of their work on behalf of large organizations rather than on behalf
of individuals.
2 7 No doubt the myth  of service  is comforting, but to the
extent that it  underpins  the  profession's  sense  that its common  sense
embodies norms that are in an important way independent of the interests
of the powerful, it provides  another of the supports for  a notion of sound
common sense that almost certainly cannot bear much normative weight.
At  this  point  it seems  to  me  appropriate  to  engage  in  a modest  ad
hominem  discussion  of another  of Finnis's works,  his treatment  of the
strategy of nuclear deterrence.2 8 That discussion has a number of targets,
25 The basic  work on  this topic  is Robert  Gordon's ongoing  study of the elite
New York bar in the nineteenth century. For some soundings  of his findings, see
Gordon,  The Ideal and the Actual in the Law: Fantasies and Practices of New
York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, at 51,  in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-
CiViL  WAR  AMERICA  (G.  Gawalt ed.  1984) 26 The phenomenon is not confined to lawyers  for the corporate  elite. It  is part
of the  strategy  of civil rights claimants,  for example,  to  explain  to a person  in
power  that that person's  interest  would  be  served  by something  that  initially
appears to be contrary to that person's interest. For one version of this point, see
Bell,  Brown v.  Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV.  L. REV. 518 (1980).
271  rely here on the analysis  of J.  HEINZ  &  E.  LAUMANN,  CHICAGO  LAWYERS:
THE  SOCIAL  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  BAR  (1982),  who  describe  the structure  of the
Chicago bar with reference to whether lawyers graduated from local or national
law schools. Local law schools, which probably are most of them, educate  lawyers
who will  indeed provide  services  to  individual  clients,  including  divorces,  will
writing,  small  business  counselling, and the  like. The  national  law  schools, in
contrast,  educate  lawyers  who  will  provide  services  to larger  organizations,  be
they corporations or the national government.  It is the latter group that primarily
influences the development of the ideology of the profession.
21  J.  FINNIS, J. BOYLE,  & G. GRiSEZ,  NUCLEAR  DETERRENCE,  MORALITY  AND  RE-
ALISM  (1987).  I  am reasonably  confident that most of the specific matters I cite
were  not  initially  drafted  by  Finnis, but he  of course  would properly  take re-
sponsibility for them.
[Vol.  38:137
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but its primary focus is on the immorality, according  to what Finnis and
his  co-authors call the tradition  of common morality, of the strategy  of
nuclear deterrence because it takes as one of its defining  aims the delib-
erate killing of innocents. In setting up their discussion, Finnis and his
co-authors include a chapter on the duty to deter Soviet advances.  That
chapter counterposes "Western culture and political life" to "the Leninist
political order," to the obvious advantage  of the former:
"Soviet rulers vary in the scale and intensity of their crimes, but their
ideology has an inherent disrespect for the dignity of individual persons,
who  can be  sacrificed  whenever  expedient to promote  the Marxist  uto-
pia. '2 9  Further, were the Soviets "not opposed,"  the consequence  would
probably be the loss of the independence of the West and therefore "great
damage  to the goods which  are protected  by Western political  and con-
stitutional order.."
3 0  This is because
there is in Soviet ideology  and politics a dynamic towards un-
settling the world order and expanding the influence,  the he-
gemony, or even the direct rule of the Soviets. The domination
and absorption of the Baltic nations, the fraudulent and forcible
repression of the nations of Eastern Europe, and the continual
efforts to support Marxist revolution around the world, belong
to a pattern of foreign policy  ....  3
1
In addition, "nations whose military power is great and is not seriously
opposed are likely to use their power to get their way whenever confronted
by other nations. '32 Further, the Soviet Union  cannot be  understood  as
having simply reacted  to "perceived threats by the West,"33 because that
"can hardly account  for the whole policy-for the extensive Soviet activ-
ities in the Third World, the build up of the Soviet navy, or, in general,
the continued  emphasis  on  developing  capacities  for  long-distance  pro-
jection of offensive military power."
34 Similarly, the actual "cautious ex-
pediency"  of Soviet foreign  policy results from Marxist  ideology, and in
any event, "Soviet support for Third World 'progressive' forces goes beyond
the  counsels  of caution  and  opportunism." 35  Finnis  and  his co-authors
conclude that "it would be quite premature to think that Soviet  officials
are at heart decent pragmatists and patriots  cast in the image,  or self-
image, of Western leaders and elites."36 They think it unlikely that "the
Western nations would long maintain their constitutional and social val-
ues if they were to renounce nuclear deterrence unilaterally.
3 7
9Id. at 69.
30 Id. at 70. 31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 71.
4Id.
35
Id.
3 6 Id. at 72.
17 Id. at 73-74.
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This theme  unsurprisingly recurs  throughout the  book. The  authors
refer to "subsequent  Soviet domination  of other  nations,"  and "the en-
slavement of many millions of persons [which] refers to no mere abstrac-
tion; those subjected  to totalitarian oppression are inhibited from living
good lives, pressed to do  wicked things, and very often deprived  of life,
liberty, and many other important goods," and they say that "one should
bear in mind the grave risks created  by movements which, while advo-
cating nuclear  disarmament,  fail  to acknowledge,  steadily and  clearly,
what would be the probable side-effect of  doing what they advocate: Soviet
domination."3 8 These are, to my mind, extraordinary  words read in 1990,
and striking words to have written in 1987. For about twenty years, the
Soviet economy has been staggering along, and there is surely little rea-
son to  think that the rulers of the Soviet  Union, no matter what their
Leninist  ideology, such  as it is, would say, would be enthusiastic  about
taking  on the burdens  of governing-"enslaving"-a  recalcitrant popu-
lation of the United States. Nor does there seem to me much evidence  of
Soviet foreign policy adventurism in the past twenty years on the ques-
tions of nuclear strategy that most concern  Finnis  and his co-authors;
the citations  of support  for Third  World revolutions  seem to me almost
completely  irrelevant to the question  of the  expansionist  desires vis-a-
vis Western democracies  of the Soviet leadership.  And, finally, there is
the  point that negotiations  over nuclear  disarmament,  again  over  the
past twenty years, have repeatedly consisted of the United States refusing
to take "yes" for an answer, saying that technological developments make
it inappropriate  now to adopt proposals that the United States had made
in  the recent past.
3 9
What can account for the myopia reflected in Finnis's discussion of the
likelihood of Soviet world domination?  I am  willing to put some weight
on the authors' understandable lack of prescience about developments  in
the Soviet Union, though I again have to stress that the book was pub-
lished in  1987 and describes  ordinary life under Soviet  rule as if Stalin
was still in charge. Another aspect of the explanation seems to me to lie
in the authors' larger conceptual program, which involves using the ques-
tion of nuclear strategy to challenge both consequentialist  and standard
deontological  arguments  about the foundations of morality  with an al-
ternative  drawn  from  what Finnis  calls  "the tradition  of the  common
morality."  Particularly  with  respect  to  consequentialism,  the  case  for
unilateral  disarmament based on "the common morality" might well be
uninteresting  unless the consequences  were presented  as extremely  se-
vere. If the consequences  are not that severe, ordinary consequentialist
calculations  might lead to adoption of a unilaterist policy, which would
accord with Finnis's preferences but for reasons quite inconsistent with
his deepest commitments.
38  Id.  at 158,  241, 353-54.
391 should also mention the use in domestic United States politics of the specter
of a "missile gap" and a "window of vulnerability" (the former by a Democratic
candidate  for the Presidency,  the latter by a Republican  one),  neither  of which
turned out to exist once the candidate took office.
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But, there seems to be more to it than that sort of intellectual strategy.
The language  Finnis and  his co-authors  use conveys,  both in the kinds
of key statements I  have  quoted  and  in their  more  passing  comments,
real belief in the picture of the likelihood of Soviet domination. A recent
book on the way in which nuclear strategists think about their enterprise
illuminates, in my  view, that belief. According  to Steven Kull, nuclear
strategists carry around in their heads two completely incompatible  un-
derstandings  of nuclear  arms. On one understanding,  nuclear arms are
just a development of conventional weaponry and nuclear strategy is an
extension  of conventional strategy. On the other understanding, nuclear
arms are quite different from conventional weapons, particularly in that
they make possible a strategy of"sufficiency"-enough  weapons to destroy
the enemy even after being subjected to a first strike-rather than equiv-
alency-the  same numbers  and types of weapons as the enemy has, be-
cause  each  weapon  can  "take out" only its equivalent.  Kull  bases his
analysis on interviews  with nuclear strategists. He  reports one of them
as follows:
He [said] that it is also important to have a countersilo response
to  a Soviet  countersilo  attack.  If the  Soviets think  that the
United States could not respond in kind, they might think the
United States would not respond. He agreed that even without
hard-target kill capability, the United States would have many
options for striking military targets-just not hardened ones.
I then asked why the Soviets would think we might not respond.
He answered that they "might" think this way and we must
guard  against  this possibility.  When  asked  if he  would  see
things this way if he were in Soviet shoes, he equivocated but
then basically said no. When I probed  into why he attributed
such reasoning to the Soviets, he did not offer any supportive
evidence but shrugged and said that "we might as well" guard
against this possibility and "there's no reason not to.""°
To an outsider, this looks completely irrational, and indeed that sense
comes  across  throughout  Kull's  work.  Policymakers  say  incompatible
things, and when  confronted with the incompatibility  adopt a variety of
rhetorical strategies that shift the ground to yet another unsatisfactory
position, only to end up saying the equivalent of "we might as well." Kull
attributes this irrationality, as it seems to me, to psychological processes.
That  is  not my concern  here. Rather,  I want  to link  my discussion  of
Finnis on nuclear strategy to my discussion of the embeddedness of law-
yers' practical reason. The link occurs, I suggest, in the fact that, in some
sense, Finnis and his co-authors  have to talk in the way they do about
Soviet  intentions and the  like if they  are  to be taken  seriously by the
group concerned  with the issue, that is, by nuclear policymakers. They
are, in short, embedded  in a social  group with a distinctive outlook  on
the world, and to get off the ground  in a discussion with that group one
40  S.  KULL,  MINDS  AT  WAR:  NUCLEAR  REALITY  AND  THE  INNER  CONFLICTS  OF
DEFENSE  POLICYMAKERS  180-81 (1989).
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has to  at least act as if the  group's assumptions  are obviously correct,
and probably has to truly believe that they are. In just the same way are
lawyers embedded in an array of social relations that defines the limits
of what they can regard as results compatible with practical reason.
Although  I  am  not  deeply  familiar  with the  tradition  in which  the
concept of practical reason plays a central part, I can imagine a response
to these cynical sociological observations about the legal profession (and
nuclear  policymaking) in the United States. The observations might be
correct,  the  response I  imagine  would  go,  but they  are  irrelevant  to a
proper  understanding  of practical  reason.  Such a  concept,  it might  be
thought, can be developed only by considering what a "purified" practical
activity  would  be, that is, one  that lacked  the  distortions  of judgment
that the sociological observations have identified.41 This response, I take
it, links Finnis's analysis to the tradition in which he is working, where
practical  reason  is theoretical  reasoning about  the connection  between
means and ends.
Within  that tradition, the objections I have raised may  be irrelevant.
Yet, as the notion of "practical reason" has been assimilated into United
States  legal theory,  a difficulty  remains. In the process  of assimilation
"practical  reason" has  come  to be  opposed  to "abstract reasoning,"  and
has come to be connected to the idea of "pragmatic reasoning." With the
tradition  assimilated  in that way, the difficulty  remains.  Relying  on a
purified profession  effectively abandons the idea of "practical reason," in
the sense in which the concept has been assimilated  into United States
legal theory, as something embodied  in, though of course going beyond,
real  practices. If we must imagine  a purified profession  in order to un-
derstand what that sort of practical reason  is, we  are, or so it seems to
me,  engaged  in the kinds of abstract  reasoning to which United States
legal theorists think the tradition of practical reason is opposed, at least
with respect to the kinds of activity to which practical  rather than the-
oretical  reason was appropriate.
My ignorance of the relevant tradition means, of course, that I may be
completely  off the  mark. Before considering  the significance  of that ig-
norance in a somewhat different way, however, I would still insist on the
accuracy of my sociological  observation that the idea of practical reason
is likely  to be assimilated  into the United States legal profession in the
form of a complacent acceptance  of things pretty much as they are, mod-
ified, of course, in a sensibly moderate way. Because moderate  reform in
the United States seems to resemble the programs of the non-Thatcherite
Conservative  "wets" in Great Britain, I do not take much comfort in the
recent interest in practical reason among United States legal academics. 42
41  1 am comforted  in conjuring  up this response by the fact  that Jurgen  Ha-
bermas, who does rely on  some idea of practical reason, has offered a response of
the sort I am imagining. And, Finnis's treatment of emotion as distorting practical
judgment seems to me also relevant here.
41  Habermas has noted, as well, the importance  of developing an idea of prac-
tical reason that avoids becoming "just a reflection of the prejudices of the adult,
white, well-educated,  western  male  of today." Habermas,  Morality and Ethical
Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply  to Discourse Ethics?, 83  Nw. U.L. REV.
38, 40  (1989).
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In concluding this section, I would like to revert to Finnis's discussion of
nuclear deterrence. For me, even though I come from a different tradition,
clearly the most powerful  portion  of the book  is its final section, "Con-
cluding  Christian  Thoughts."  That  section  more  credibly  presents the
unilateralist  argument than the remainder of the book. It is suggestive
of the way in which social relations limit what counts as an exercise  of
practical reason that Finnis and his co-authors tell readers in their Pre-
face that they can skip this section if they want to.
43
III. TRADITIONS  AND LEGAL  REASONING
As one who finds  the critical legal studies approach to law congenial,
I have  been struck,  amused  almost,  by the kinds  of criticisms  levelled
against the works of Roberto  Unger by certain British scholars,  among
them Finnis.
44  These  scholars  apply  the  standard  techniques  of philo-
sophical  analysis  in  the  central  Anglo-American  tradition  to  Unger's
work, and find it wanting. Yet, one might think that they have committed
what they might describe  as a category mistake.  When I  read Unger, I
am  struck  by  the distance  between  his  work  and  most  contemporary
political philosophy in  the United States. I have found it  easiest to think
of Unger as jurisprudence's Gabriel Garcia Marquez. The analogy is help-
ful  in  this context because  Marquez  is a magical  realist,  which means
that, because  he is a realist, there is some connection between the world
he writes about and the world we live in. Similarly, Unger writes some-
thing  that has  some  connection  with  mainstream  political  philosophy.
Yet, using the  standard  techniques  I  have  referred  to  as  the basis for
criticizing Unger's  work  seems  to me  like  criticizing Marquez's  magic
realism on the ground that no one really lives for hundreds of years.
One might respond that it  is not Unger's critics but Unger himself who
has committed the category mistake.  Marquez, after all, calls his works
novels. Unger, in  contrast, appears to be talking to practitioners  of phi-
losophy in  the United States. He  makes general claims about language,
truth, and  reason that look much  like  philosophy  as they  conceive  it.
Further, one might wonder what sort of response Unger wishes to elicit
from his readers. If  he wants them to give rational assent to the propo-
sitions  he offers,  surely, his  critics  would  say, his arguments  must be
subjected  to the kinds of rational  analysis they have deployed.  I agree
with that point, and confess that I would be much more comfortable were
I able to say that, having read the critics, I continue to give my rational
assent to Unger's  arguments. Perhaps because  of my limitations as  an
analyst, however, I find myself largely persuaded by Finnis's criticism of
Unger.
45  Yet, Unger still seems right to me in  an important way. This
41  J.  FINNIS, J. BOYLE,  &  G. GRISEZ,  supra note 27,  at vi ("A reader concerned
simply with common morality's implications for deterrence  need read only Parts
One, Two, and Five, which stand independently of... the concluding reflections
in Part Six").
See Finnis, The Critical  Legal Studies Movement, 30  AM. J. JuRIs. 21 (1985);
Ewald, Unger's  Legal Philosophy:  A  Critical  Legal Study, 97 YALE L.J. 665 (1988).
45  Though  not by Ewald's.
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suggests that, at least insofar as I am unable to counter Unger's critics,
I must believe that Unger seeks something other than rational assent-
perhaps, as the analogy to Marquez suggests, esthetic appreciation of his
having captured  something about the world  in which we live.
I mention the possibility of a category  mistake because  I think it has
some bearing on Finnis's natural  law enterprise. At first glance, Finnis
seems to draw extraordinarily  strong and obviously controversial conclu-
sions from extremely weak premises.4 6  Further, again at first glance there
seems to be some tension between Finnis's invocation of practical reason,
which would appear to call upon judgments socialized professionals make
in the course of dealing with particular problems that present themselves
in enormous detail in their professional lives, and his acceptance of rather
quick  abstract arguments  from those weak premises to his strong con-
clusions.
These difficulties,  though, disappear when  we understand that Finnis
operates from within a particular  philosophical tradition, whose  aspira-
tion  is, in part, to demonstrate  that  relatively  abstract  arguments are
rationally  grounded  in understandings  we  gain  from  practical reason.
Those of us outside that tradition  might raise  our eyebrows at the tra-
dition's continued adherence to that project, which has been offering itself
for rational  agreement for almost a thousand years and which appears,
at best,  to have  run up against impenetrable  barriers in the  past two
hundred  years.  Yet,  of course,  two hundred  years  is a relatively  short
period of time, as these things go, as indeed is a thousand years. Outsiders'
skepticism  therefore  need  not cast any  rational  doubt  on the  insiders'
project.
Nonetheless, there are reasons to be, if not skeptical in the sense I have
just suggested, somewhat distanced from Finnis's project. These reasons
are suggested  by  the  category  mistake  committed  in the  criticisms  of
Unger's work. The  mistake there  is to assess work within  a particular
tradition according to the criteria used in another tradition. So too with
Finnis's project:  Precisely  because  it is located  within a particular tra-
dition, outsiders to that tradition really cannot get a proper handle on it
for purposes  of criticizing or  even evaluating it. For those outside  the
tradition,  his work can be  edifying,  illuminating some  aspects  of what
we  see  in the world without, however, commanding our rational  agree-
ment-just as Marquez's  magical realism can illuminate the real world
without  being realistic  according  to  the criteria  most  of us  use  in our
daily lives, and just as Unger's jurisprudence can be illuminating without
satisfying the demands of the central tradition of recent Anglo-American
political philosophy.47
"See  Shearmur, Natural  Law Without Metaphysics?: The Case of John Finnis,
38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 123 (1990).
41 A. MACiNTYRE,  supra note 16, concludes  with an argument that discussions
across traditions can be more than merely edifying but can, in some circumstances
at least, result in the rational replacement  of one tradition by another. His anal-
ysis deserves much more extended treatment than this footnote, but in the present
context I should  note that I find his argument fundamentally  inconsistent with
the entire structure of his argument elsewhere in the book.
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In that  spirit,  I  would  like  to  conclude  with  one  observation  about
Finnis's presentation in this Symposium. As Finnis presents his natural
law theory, immorality, at least in its "paradigmatic form," involves the
emotional distortion ofjudgment. Evil, that is, is, or is at least connected
to, "bad emotion." There are other traditions, though, in which evil and
bad  emotion play rather different roles. For those who find  Freud's  in-
sights into human personality  illuminating, bad  emotion is an inerad-
icable part of personality, which can be brought under control,  if at all,
only to a degree. In that tradition, Finnis's hopeful assumption that bad
emotion can be placed under the full control of rationality, which appears
to be an essentially unalloyed good,
48 is mere romanticism.
49
Alternatively, of course, we might see evil as ineradicable. That appears
to have been Dostoyevsky's view, for example, to invoke a figure who is,
in the broadest  sense, within  the same tradition  as Finnis. If, as in my
tradition, one does not believe in God's redemptive  grace, one is likely to
be  even more  cautious  about accepting  the view offered by Finnis that
practical reason, refined through rationality  purged of bad emotion, will
justify  fairly  precise  conclusions  about  controversial  moral  issues.  We
will, of course, have to do the best we can, but, alas, the best we can do
may  be quite limited.
8 For my skepticism about the assumption that rationality is necessarily good,
see Tushnet, Flourishing  and the Problem of Evil, 63  TUL.  L. REv.  1631,  1647
(1989).
49 See,  e.g.,  H. MARCUSE,  EROS AND  CIVILIZATION  (1956).
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